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I. Research Problem 
 
Interest groups play a central role in a democratic polity. In this context, in 
political science an important line of research focuses on different issues related 
to the organization of interest groups (IGs), as well as on the role they play in 
the decision making process (Baumgartner & Leech 1998; Baumgartner et. al. 2009; 
Binderkrantz et. al. 2014; Dür & De Bièvre 2008). The literature that concentrates 
on their role in decision making process (DMP) touches on different related issues, 
such as the patterns of participation of IGs, their influence on public policy 
decisions, and the determinants of that influence. As a result of this effort, 
abundant evidence on the topic is available for analytical purposes. 
IGs role in Foreign Policy has also been thoroughly analyzed by comparative 
research, which has concentrated mainly on the case of the US, examining the 
activities of IGs and their effects at different policy levels (Jacobs & Page, 2005; 
Keohane & Milner 1996; McKormick 2012; Milner 1997; Rogowski, 1989). In the case 
of the European Union (EU), even though the role of IGs in DMP has been largely 
analyzed, in the specific case of Foreign Policy the academic attention has been 
rather scarce (Shapovalova, 2015: 45; Voltolini, 2013). 
In the case of Chile, even though many scholars have made interesting 
contributions, a more comprehensive research on the issue is still lacking (Gamboa et. 
al. 2016). This gap is even deeper in the case of Foreign Policy, and particularly in 
that of Foreign Trade Policy, even though the latter has occupied a central role in 
the last 27 years in Chile (Direcon 2009). Moreover, although useful for 
understanding important decisions on Foreign Policy, this literature has mainly 
concentrated on specific issues or cases, having neglected a more systematic 
approach (Bull 2008; Direcon 2009; Gamboa 
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2013; Herreros 2010). Therefore, the role of IGs in Foreign Policy remains 
understudied. If we want to better understand how Chilean Foreign Policy is 
made, and how the civil society participates in it, more research on the topic is 
needed. 
This paper aims to contribute to fill this gap, by analyzing the participation 
and influence of IGs on Chilean Foreign Policy between 1990 and 2014. To carry out 
the study, first, we examine the participation of IGs in the parliamentary discussion 
of the international treaties Chile signed in this period. Second, we analyze the 
issue of the influence of IGs on Foreign Policy decisions using the methodology of 
preference attainment. Basically, it consists in identifying the preferences expressed 
by IGs before Congress with regard to the International treaties, and comparing them 
with the approved texts. In this context, we will pay special attention on the role of IGs 
with regard to Foreign Trade Policy, which is an area where IGs have been very active 
(Gamboa 2013). 
To accomplish this task, we created an original database of 590 international 
treaties (of any kind) that Chile subscribed between 1990 and 20143. This contains 
information about the IGs that participated in their discussion, and the opinions 
they expressed. We started in 1990 because it was the year of democratic 
restoration. Also, 2014 is the year of the last completed presidential term. 
We argue as follows. First, the participation of IGs in the discussion of international 
treaties is rather low, as a very high percentage of treaties (more than 85%) are 
analyzed in congress without IGs intervention. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are the 
type of treaty that shows highest levels of participation on average (even though it is 
still low). Second, that the general pattern of distribution of IGs participation by 
type of group is highly unbalanced. This, because business IGs account for more than 
two thirds of it. This imbalance is even higher when we look at the congressional 
debate of treaties dealing with economic matters, and especially at FTAs. At the 
same time, however, the participation is more balanced when only non-­­economic 
treaties are considered. Third, our   preference   attainment   analysis   underlies   that   
the   agreement   between   the preferences of business IGs and the content of 
treaties is not greater than that of other type of IGs. 
 
3 The database was built with information obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
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This work is divided into five sections. First, we describe our analytical frame, 
which bases on the main comparative research on the issue. Second, we explain the 
institutional setting of Foreign Policy formulation in Chile, and the mechanisms the IGs 
can use in order to exert influence on it. Third, we outline our methodological strategy. 
Fourth, we present and discuss our main results. Lastly, we conclude. 
 
II. Analytical Frame 
 
The role the IGs4 play in the DMP has been extensively analyzed in Political 
Science, especially with regard to the cases of the United States (US), the European 
Union (EU), and some European countries, like Germany or Denmark (Baumgartner 
& Leech 1998; Binderkrantz et. al. 2014; Dür 2008; Dür & Matteo, 2012; Klüver 
2012; Yackee & Yackee 2006). The research has focused on different related 
topics, such as the processes of group mobilization, the organizational characteristics 
of the IGs, the strategies they deploy to promote their interest vis-­­a-­­vis diverse 
institutions to influence policy decisions, and the determinants of that participation 
and influence (Baumgartner & Leech 1998). 
With regard to the first topic addressed in this work, participation and 
how it distributes among types of group, academic research has made significant 
progress. In the case of the US, there is abundant evidence that points out that 
business IGs, in general terms, are more active in DMP than other groups, like 
citizens, professionals, labor organizations, or public institutions (Baumgartner & 
Leech 2001: 1194; Baumgartner et. al 2009: 9). In the case of the EU the evidence 
reveals a similar pattern (Klüver 2012: 1123; Dür & Matteo, 2012; Binderkrantz et. al. 
2014), even though the predominance of business seems to be lower than in the case 
of the US (Gamboa et al. 2016: 145). 
 
 
4 There is an extensive discussion on the concrete meaning of the concept of interest group 
(Baroni et al. 2014). Here we take the definition used by Gamboa and his colleagues (2016), 
which is very adequate for this work´s purposes. An IG will be defined as any formally 
existent organization that defends an interest in that capacity before Congress.  Therefore, we 
exclude those people who participate in legislative debates on their own account (even when 
they belong to an IG), as well as political parties and state organizations. 
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Scholars have also analyzed if this pattern holds when we distinguish by 
policy areas. The evidence shows that when we consider only "economic" issues, 
the predominance of business IG is even greater. But, when we look only at "non-
­­economic" policy areas, the distribution of participation is notably more balanced 
among types of IG. (Binderkrantz et. al. 2014: 889). According to data collected by 
Gamboa et. al (2016), this is also the case of Chile. In their study they recorded 1777 
interventions of IGs in 571 law making processes carried out in Congress between 
2006 and 2014. 977 of the interventions were made during the discussion of 
economic bills, and among them more than 50% by business IGs. But, when only non-
­­economic bills are considered, business IGs accounted for only 25% of 800 
participations, even less than professional groups (Gamboa et. al 2016: 154). 
Our second research interest refers to that of IGs influence on policy 
decisions. Even though this is an issue of major importance, and despite significant 
efforts, it is an area where until now academic research has made fewer advances. 
A Dür notes, this is due to different reasons, like the fact that it is exerted through 
many different channels, the existence of the phenomena of counteractive lobbying, 
and that influence is wielded at different stages of the DMP (Dür 2008 561: see also 
Helboe 2013). 
In spite of these difficulties, scholars have taken up the challenge of 
developing methods to measure influence empirically. Three main strategies have 
been designed (Dür 2008). The first is process tracing, which consists of detailed 
studies of a one or few specific decision processes, identifying the IGs that 
participate, their strategies and influence attempts, and finally evaluating if the 
decisions reflect their preferences or not. Simply put, as Dür says, this is about to "try 
to uncover the steps by which causes affect outcomes" (2008: 562). Having these 
features, this is a method clearly more appropriate for case studies, that allow for in-
­­depth analysis of cases. The second is known as attributed influence, and bases on 
surveys to experts, or to organizations leaders as a mean to determine the degree 
of influence of the IGs in the political system. An example of the use of this method 
is the work done by Jacobs and Page (2005), which relies on surveys to figure out 
which IGs exert more influence on US Foreign Policy. The third method is 
preference attainment, in which "the outcomes of political processes are compared 
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with the ideal points of actors" (Dür 2008: 566). Therefore, according to this 
methodology, the higher the level of agreement between IG preferences and the final 
decisions, the more influential that IG is considered. 
Each method has strengths and weaknesses, being more or less useful 
depending on the type of research one wants to conduct. Considering the objectives of 
this paper, we choose to use a preference attainment strategy, because it is which 
better allows us to compare IGs Foreign Policy preferences and policy decisions 
(treaties` contents), and also to obtain a measure of influence considering a large N. 
The evidence generated by comparative research is inconclusive about which 
type of IG is more influential in DMP. On the one hand, studies in the US have 
shown that business IGs exerts more influence in DMP than other groups, for 
example when administrative decisions are considered (Yackee & Yackee 2006). 
The same has been argued in the case of US Foreign Policy, where the evidence 
reveals that they are more influential than labor unions and expert communities 
(Jacobs & Page 2005: 120). On the other, however, scholars have shown that 
business IGs not always "get what they want", and that their influence capacity is 
dependent upon other factors, as the counteractive Lobby they face in the specific 
policy processes (Hojnacki et. al. 2015), or the kind of objective they pursue5 
(Godwin et. al. 2013: 102). In the same vein, studies in the EU suggest that in the 
EU "industry wins too but so do citizen groups and foundations", and then no pattern 
can be identified (Mahoney 2007: 54). In the case of Chile, the analysis of Gamboa et. 
al demonstrates that the business IGs, contrary to the initial expectations, do not get 
more than other groups in DMP (2016: 157). 
This brief account of the findings of the academic research provides a useful 
guide for carrying out this work. First, considering the participation trends in DMP, it 
shows that there is an apparent clear trend: that the business IG participates more 
than other types of groups in it. Second, that we should expect that business IGs 
get no more than other groups in DMP, that is, that they are not more influential 
than other. We will get back to these issues when we analyze our results. 
 
 
 
5 For example, it is argued that when one pursues the maintenance of the status quo has more 
chances to get it, than when one demand a major change of it. 
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III. Mechanisms of IGs participation in the Chilean Foreign Policy Making Process. 
 
 
As in most presidential systems, the Chilean Constitution stipulates that one 
special power of the president is to conduct the political relations with other 
countries (art. 32 n. 15). Accordingly, to carry out negotiations, to conclude them, 
and to subscribe treaties with other foreign actors are an exclusive power of the 
president (Art. 32 no. 15). Nevertheless, those international agreements can enter into 
force only if ratified by congress (arts. 32 no. 15 and 54 no. 1). The quora required 
for the approval depends on the content of the specific treaties (it can go from 
simple majority to two thirds of the members of each chamber). To this, it must be 
added that the Congress can only either to approve the treaty submitted by the 
president, or to reject it. It can not introduce amendments to it, modifying its 
content. In this regard, Congress may only suggest the formulation of reservations 
(when it is possible according to the international law) or the introduction of 
interpretative declarations (art. 54 no. 1). 
This institutional frame sets two main (official) mechanisms for the IGs to 
try to influence Foreign Policy decisions. The first is to make direct contact with 
policy makers (and negotiators) during the bargain process of the treaties, using the 
regular channels the law provides. In some negotiations, like most about Free 
Trade Agreements, a special mechanism is implemented, the so called "room next 
door" (Bull 2008; Gamboa 2013). In this, the IGs representatives follow the 
negotiations from a space that is next to that in which they are being held. Then, 
they can interact with authorities in real time, expressing their preferences and 
concerns with regard to the course of the negotiations. 
The second is to participate during the parliamentary discussion. Once a treaty is 
signed, the Executive submits it to the Parliament for the ratification process. To 
enter into force, the treaty in question must be approved by both chambers. The 
process begins with the discussion in the first chamber (known as chamber of 
origin),6 where it is first analyzed by an specialized committee (normally the 
 
6 With few exceptions, the constitution allows that the discussion can begin either in Senate 
or in the Chamber of Deputies.
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Committee of Foreign Affairs), and then by the assembly. If the treaty is approved by 
the first chamber, it passes to the other. Here the same procedure applies.  
The stage of committee discussion provides the opportunity for IGs to 
participate and express their opinion with regard to the content of the treaties. The 
House Rules of each chamber regulate the access of IGs to the sessions, giving ample 
space for any IG (or private persons) that want to express their opinions to do so 
(Gamboa et. al. 2016: 150). The interventions of MPs and IGs are registered, so that 
there is an official record of them. 
 
IV. Data and Method 
 
As we stated before, in this working paper we have two related objectives. On 
the one hand, we seek to describe IGs participation in the legislative process of Foreign 
Policy bills, and, on the other hand, to analyze IGs position regarding those bill 
proposals. In order to achieve these two objectives, this research is based on publicly 
available information. Data sources and methods used are described in what follows. 
a) Interest Groups’ Participation. To analyze IGs participation in the 
legislative decision making process on matters of Foreign Policy, we built an original 
data base with information related to the main characteristics of those processes. 
The data used was obtained from documents elaborated by Chilean Congress, known 
as Historia de la Ley, which provides an extensive and detailed account of the legislative 
process that every bill underwent until its final approval. 
First, using information provided by Congress, we identified the bill proposals 
related to Foreign Policy that were approved between 1990 and 2014, according to 
the Senate´s website. In other words, we considered every international treaty that 
required legislative approval in the first five governments after transition to democracy. 
We identified 590 bill proposals that fulfilled those requirements. For every bill 
proposal, then, we collected the following information: title, date in which the proposal 
started and finished its legislative process, type of treaty, with whom the treaty was 
signed, and every IG that participated in the legislative discussion.  Furthermore, 
we  gathered  publicly available information to identify the type of group and the 
policy domain in which they are expected to develop their lobby activities more 
frequently. 
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Groups were classified, following Gamboa et al (2016), in one the following 
categories: (a) Business groups, including businesses, and business associations; (b) 
Labor groups, including unions and associations that represent the interests of 
workers; (c) Citizen groups, including all those groups created for the defense and 
promotion of particular interests; (d) Professional groups, including professional 
associations, research institutions and think tanks; and (e) Public institutions, including 
those public institutions that are related to the State, but are not directly part of 
the executive or legislative powers. 
b) Preference Attainment. As we mentioned before, preference attainment is 
a methodology develop to study IGs influence in the decision-­­making process, which 
is based in the comparison of IGs ideal point and the content of the approved bill. 
It requires, therefore, information regarding the content of the treaties under 
consideration and IGs position about them. 
We selected 28 treaties that had IG participation in their legislative process: 14 
of them are Free Trade Agreements, and the other 14 were randomly selected among 
the other treaties signed by Chile. These 28 treaties represent the 4,7% of all the 
treaties considered by Congress between 1990 and 2014, and the 32,2% of the 
treaties where there was IGs participation in the legislative debate. We design this form 
of treaty selection because it allows us to compare IGs influence in different types of 
treaties and, particularly, in Free Trade Agreements, which is one of the main objectives 
of this working paper. 
For each of these 28 treaties, and using information provided by Historia de la 
Ley, we analyze the position expressed by IGs, regarding the contents of each treaty 
under consideration in the legislative debate. We register a total of 225 opinions, 
which were coded as in favor of the treaty, against the treaty and as agreement with 
objections. With this information, we analyzed which types of groups, and under what 
circumstances, show more favorable opinions with the contents of the treaties. In 
other words, which groups gets what they want from them. 
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V. Results 
 
 
A. Overview. Foreign Policy and International treaties, Chile 1990-2014 
 
 
Before we present the data on participation and influence, we will provide 
general information with regard to the international treaties Chile has subscribed in 
the period. First, according to Table 1, Chile signed 590 treaties in this period of 24 
years, that is, an average of 24,6 per year. At the same time, however, it must be noted 
that the "intensity" of the Chilean activity in the international stage is not balanced 
considering the different presidential terms. In effect, the average of treaties per year 
in considerably higher (above 30) for the two first governments after democratic 
restoration, Aylwin (37,3) and Frei (31,8), and much lower during the three following: 
Lagos (23,8); Bachelet (20), and Piñera (6,7). 
 
Table 1. Chile: International Treaties (1990-­­2014). 
 
 N Percentage 
President   
Aylwin  (1990-­­1994) 149 25,3% 
Frei (1994-­­2000) 191 32,4% 
Lagos (2000-­­2006) 143 24,2% 
Bachelet  (2006-­­2010) 80 13,6% 
Piñera (2010-­­2014) 27 4,6% 
Total 590 100% 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
Second, Table 2 shows the distribution of the treaties by foreign partner. 
Almost one third of them are multilateral treaties, while the two most "important" 
partners are Europe (28,8% of the treaties) and Latin America (24,7%). With other 
regions, the amount of treaties is significantly lower. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that for Chile those regions are not important. For example, Chile 
has not signed a great amount of treaties with Asian countries (maybe only the 
necessary to regulate what is needed), but many of them are important trade partners 
for Chile, like Japan or China. In this sense, to sign a higher number of treaties is not 
always a measure of closeness or distance between countries. 
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Table 2. International Treaties: Chilean Partners. 
 
 Aylwin Frei Lagos Bachelet Piñera Total 
Multilateral 30,2% 28,3% 37,8% 37,5% 22,2% 32,0% 
Latin America 32,2% 28,3% 23,1% 31,2% 37,0% 28,8% 
Europe 22,1% 30,4% 25,2% 16,2% 22,2% 24,7% 
Southeast Asia 5,4% 3,1% 2,8% 5,0% 7,4% 4,1% 
North America 4,0% 3,7% 2,8% 1,2%  3,1% 
Asia 0,7% 2,6% 3,5% 3,8% 3,7% 2,5% 
Middle East 2,7% 2,1% 1,4% 2,5% 3,7% 2,2% 
Oceania 0,7% 1,6% 2,8% 2,5% 3,7% 1,9% 
Africa 2,0%  0,7%   0,7% 
TOTAL 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
Third, Table 3 contains information about the matters the 590 treaties 
regulate. We distinguish four categories: a) Economic, which includes all treaties 
that regulate economic relations. We divide it into two subcategories for analytical 
purposes (see below). One includes all the treaties that the General Directorate of 
International Economic Relations (Direcon) of the Chilean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs classifies as Free Trade Agreements. These are 18. The other brings 
together all other economic agreements, like the Economic Cooperation 
Agreements, the Investments Agreements, or the treaties that deal. i.e. with 
agricultural measures , taxation or air transport. The second is Cooperation, and 
includes all international agreements on matters like Security, Science Development, 
Education, Justice or Environment. The third is Political Relations, grouping all 
treaties on this matter, like those that regulate border transit, immigration, 
diplomatic agreements or human rights. The last is Social Policy, which includes the 
treaties dealing with issues like agreements on labor regulation or social insurance.
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Table 3. Chile, International Treaties 1990-20014  by Topic. 
 
 N % 
Economy 187 31,7 
Cooperation (non-economic) 173 29,3 
Political Relations 162 27,5 
Social Policy 53 9,0 
Other 15 2,5 
Total 590 100 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
The table provides interesting information with regard to the priorities of 
Chilean diplomacy since 1990. In particular, it suggests that the "economic 
diplomacy" and the "cooperation diplomacy" have concentrated the efforts in the 
period. In effect, economic agreements account for 31,7% of the 590 included in the 
database, agreements subscribed by Chile since 1990, (a much higher percentage than 
that of political treaties) followed by cooperation treaties (29,3%). These data, 
moreover, are consistent with the analysis of Klaveren (2011), who also underscores 
the relevance of these themes for Chilean Foreign Policy. However, as Klaveren also 
suggests, Chilean diplomacy have also other important concerns, like the relation 
with the neighbor countries, activity that does not necessarily materialize in written 
agreements. 
 
B. Interest Groups and Chilean Foreign Policy. Participation Trends 1990-2014 
 
This section discusses IGs participation in Foreign Policy. To do this, as we 
explained before, we collected data regarding IGs interventions in parliamentary 
discussion about international treaties agreed between the Chilean government and 
foreign partners. In particular, we present data regarding general trends in 
participation, and how IGs participation is distributed according to group types 
and matters under discussion, paying special attention to IGs participation in Foreign 
Trade policy. 
With respect to IGs participation, Table 4 shows that in only 87 (14,7%) out of 
590 international treaties, one or more IGs assisted to Congress to express their 
opinion about them. In those 87 bill proposals, a total of 173 IGs participated, with 
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an average of 2,1 proposals per group. The minimum number of projects in which an 
IG participated was 1, and the maximum was 21 treaties proposals. In more detail, a 
71,1% of IGs assisted to the discussion of just 1 project, and 13,3% participated in 2 
discussions. Only 6 groups (2,9%) participated in the discussion of 9 or more treaties 
proposals. 
 
Table 4. IGs Participation in Foreign Policy. 
 
 N Total 
With groups 87 14,7% 
Without groups 503 85,3% 
Total 590 100,0% 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
This information shows, therefore, that Foreign Policy is not a major area of 
interest to IGs. This result, moreover, is consistent with information compiled by 
the authors in other research (Gamboa et el 2014), that analyzed IGs participation in 
571 bill proposals that were discussed in Congress between 2006 and 2014. 
According to that data, in 83% of the bills related to Foreign Policy, no IG took 
part in the discussion. Furthermore, Foreign Policy also shows the lowest IGs 
participation as compared to other areas of public policy: an average of 0,69 
groups per proposal participated in foreign policy, while in bills related to fishing 
had an average of 10,5 groups, education shows an average of 8,9 or health and 
average of 8,9. Only in proposals related to Human Rights and Defense IGs 
participation is lower (0,19 and 0,08 groups respectively). 
Even in this case, with low levels of participation, we need to ask about how 
that participation is distributed, both with respect to the type of groups and to the 
different issues of the treaties. Regarding group types, the evidence in Table 5 
clearly points out that business IGs are the main actor in the legislative discussion vis-
à-vis other types of groups. And this result holds when we consider both the number 
of discrete groups (173) and the total number of registered interventions in Congress 
(357). 
In effect, when we consider discrete groups, results in Table 5 show that 
Business IGs are the ones that participate, by far, more in the legislative discussion: 
Business IGs are 102 out of 173, representing the 59% of total groups. They are 
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followed, in terms of number of groups participating, by Citizens groups, which 
represent the 15,6% of the total. Other types of groups have a representation of less 
than 10% each. 
 
 
Table 5. Participation by Groups Type. 
 Discrete Groups Interventions by Group type 
 N % N % 
Business 102 59,0 239 66,9 
Labor 14 8,1 22 6,2 
Citizens 27 15,6 28 7,8 
Professionals 17 9,8 45 12,6 
Public Institutions 5 2,9 10 2,8 
Other 8 4,6 13 3,7 
Total 173 100 357 100 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
On the other hand, when we consider the number of interventions, as 
Table 5 demonstrates, the differences between groups are even larger. Out of 357 
registered interventions, 66,9% are due to business IGs. They are followed by 
professional groups (12,6%), and the rest of the groups have a marginal 
participation, with less than 10% of the interventions each. 
This pattern of unequal participation, is consistent with the general one 
identified by Gamboa et al (2016: 153), which also show that business IGs are the type 
of group that participate more, showing a large difference with other groups. 
According to the authors, business IGs represent 41,5% of groups and 39% of 
interventions. In the results reported in this work, however, this pattern is even more 
pronounced, showing that in the case of Foreign Policy representation of interest is 
even more unequal. 
Now, considering this general pattern, what happens when we analyze 
independently treaties on economic matters and treaties about other issues? The 
data of Table 6 are very clear. On the one hand, they show that when the 
parliamentary discussion is about economic matters, business IGs have an 
overwhelming participation and are responsible for 85% of the interventions. 
Other groups have a minor participation, with the exception of professional groups 
(9,3% of interventions). 
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Table 6. Participation by Type of groups. Interventions 
 Economic Non-Economic Total 
 N % N %  
Business 210 85 29 26,4 239 
Labor 7 2,8 15 13,6 22 
Citizens 3 1,2 25 22,7 28 
Professionals 23 9,3 22 20,0 45 
Public 
Institutions 
2 0,8 8 7,3 10 
Other 2 0,8 11 10,0 13 
 247 100 110 100 347 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
We can also add more specific data regarding participation exclusively in the 
discussion of Free Trade Agreements, which we consider as part of the treaties 
related to economic matters. First, FTAs concentrate 179 interventions, that is, 
51,6% of all interventions done between 1990 and 2014 in foreign policy, and a 
72,5% of interventions related to economic issues. Therefore, all in all, trade 
policy is by far the issue that attracts more IGs participation regarding Foreign 
Policy. Additionally, if we consider groups participation within FTAs, business 
groups are again the most active group type, being accountable for 85,2% of 
interventions. 
On the other hand, however, when non-­­economic issues are discussed, the 
pattern of participation is different. As is shown in Table 6, business IGs are the 
one with more interventions vis-­­à-­­vis other groups (representing a 26% of the 
total), but are closely followed by professional groups (20%) and citizen groups 
(22,7%). These results suggest that, as mentioned before, the participation 
pattern changes in the expected direction, showing a more balanced one, as has 
been also argued in other cases (Gamboa et al 2016; Bindenkrantz et al, 2014). 
 
C. Preferences and decisions. Who gets what they want in Chilean Foreign Policy 
 
In this last section we present the results obtained from our study about 
who gets what they want in Chilean Foreign Policy. As we mentioned before, this 
study uses preference  attainment  as  the  method  for  comparing  and  
analyzing  IGs  expressed preferences in the parliamentary debates about treaties. 
In this context, therefore, when preferences expressed by groups are in agreement 
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with the final decision –the final text of the treaty-­­ we understand that they are 
getting what they want. 
The main findings of this study are as follows. First, as can be observed in 
Table 7, IGs express, in general, favorable opinions regarding the contents of the 
treaties. In effect, from a total of 225 coded opinions for 28 treaties, the 76,4% of 
them are in agreement with the proposed contents, while a 13,3% expressed a 
general agreement, but with main objections to some of their specific contents. 
Lastly, only a 10,2% of the opinions are negative. 
 
Table 7. Opinions expressed by IGs 
 
 TOTAL FTAs Other Treaties 
 N % N % N % 
In favor 172 76,4 126 75,9% 46 78,0% 
With 
Objections 
30 13,3 
25 15,1% 5 8,5% 
Oppose 23 10,2 15 9,0% 8 13,6% 
Total 225 100,0 166 100,0% 59 100,0% 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
This pattern is reproduced when we compare the opinions given regarding 
FTAs with those expressed about other types of treaties. As can be seen in Table 7, the 
levels of agreement are similar in each case, existing no statistically significant 
differences. 
Second, when we consider the opinions expressed by group type, the 
pattern previously described remains the same –that is, in general, opinions are 
favorable to treaties. The only exception can be observed in the case of labor groups, 
whose opinions are in a 25% of the cases favorable, a third of them show 
objections, and a 42% are unfavorable to the sign of treaties. In any case, the 
participation of labor groups is minor, making it difficult to generalize these results to 
the positions labor unions express about Foreign Policy in general. 
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Table 8. Opinions expressed by IGs by group type 
  
Citizens 
 
Business 
 
Professionals 
 
Labor 
 
Other 
 
Total 
In favor 91,3% 79,6% 66,7% 25,0% 75,0% 76,4% 
With 
objections 
8,7% 11,7% 16,7% 33,3% 25,0% 13,3% 
Oppose 0,0% 8,6% 16,7% 41,7% 0,0% 10,2% 
N 23 162 24 12 4 225 
% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
 
 
Third, in order to evaluate the relative influence of different groups and 
other factors that can affect that influence, we run a logistic regression. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that indicates favorable positions to the treaties (1 = 
in favor; 0 = oppose and with objections). Independent variables are the following: a 
dummy variable that indicates the type of treaty (1 = FTAs, 0 = other treaties), the 
type of group expressing their opinion (two dummy variables, one that indicates 
business IGs and the other Labor IGs), a variable that measures the length of the 
legislative process, and the number of bills in which each group participates –as an 
indication of expertise in lobby activities. In the last two variables we used the natural 
log. 
Table 9: Logistic Regression on influence 
 B E.T. Wald Gl Sig. Exp(B) 
FTA ,588 ,722 ,664 1 ,415 1,801 
Business ,569 ,460 1,535 1 ,215 1,767 
Workers -­­1,853 ,786 5,556 1 ,018 ,157 
ln_length ,705 ,263 7,201 1 ,007 2,023 
ln_number 
of bills 
,393 ,180 4,803 1 ,028 1,482 
Constant -­­3,714 1,869 3,949 1 ,047 ,024 
N 225 
Chi2 32,350*** 
Pseudo R2 0,205 
*** p < 0,001 
Source: Authors’ own construction, using data obtained from www.congreso.cl. 
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Results indicate that, controlling for other factors, IGs get what they want 
from Foreign Policy when the legislative process is longer, and when they have more 
experience in lobby activities. Moreover, the results also reveal that business IGs do 
not have more influence than other group types, ceteris paribus, while groups 
representing labor unions and workers are less likely to get what they want. Finally, 
the results also show that, the likelihood of success or influence in the legislative 
discussion regarding foreign policy is not related to the type of treaty. In effect, 
controlling for other factors, groups obtain what they want in all types of treaties. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This research has provided with ample and interesting evidence in relation to 
the initially proposed objectives. It constitutes a contribution to the study of Chilean 
Foreign Policy in general, and to the way civil society relates to it. Moreover, given 
the research methodology used, its results can be compared to the ones obtained in 
other cases. 
On the one hand, with respect to participation, the evidence highlights the 
relevance of several characteristics of the Chilean political system. First, it 
demonstrates that Foreign Policy is a policy area in which IGs participation is 
minor, and that they attempt to intervene in the legislative process of only a few 
(14,5%) treaties. Additionally, as we mentioned before, foreign policy is one of the 
policy areas with the lowest participation average. 
Second, the distribution of participation according to group type is highly 
uneven. In effect, business IGs concentrates a large percentage of the lobby activity 
done in this policy area, both in the total number of groups participating and in the 
number of interventions. In fact, this distribution pattern is even more uneven than 
the one observed when we consider other policy areas, as argued by previous research. 
Third, and despite this pattern, when we consider the distribution of 
participation according to issues, we observe an important change in the levels of 
participation by groups. Results show that there is more balance between 
business, professional, and citizen groups when the proposals being discussed are non-
-economic. 
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Fourth, the research also reveals another characteristic of IGs participation, 
which is related to the way that participation among groups is distributed within 
economic treaties. In particular, we observe that the subgroup of FTAs concentrate 
more than 72% of the interventions made by IGs in economic-­­related treaties. This 
result confirms that free trade is the most important issue that mobilizes IGs 
participation on matters of foreign policy. 
On the other hand, the preference attainment analysis also provided with 
interesting results. First, it shows that when IGs intervene in the parliamentary 
discussion of treaties, they do it to express support to the initiative. In effect 3 out of 4 
interventions made by IGs are in favor of the approval of the treaty. A similar pattern 
emerges when we consider the subsample of FTAs, with the exception of labor IGs, 
which in general present a critical position to them. Second, our regression analysis 
could not provide a conclusive result regarding which type of group see their 
preferences better represented. This is probably associated to the distribution of 
preferences expressed by groups (mostly in favor of treaties), but it is different to 
results obtained in other studies (Jacobs & Page 2005), and counterintuitive in light 
of participation data.  The likelihood of IGs success is not related either to the type of 
treaty under discussion. 
Together, these results suggest two groups of questions to address in future 
research. The first one is related to what explains the low level of IGs 
participation in Foreign Policy. According to the evidence presented, and informal 
communications with practitioners and experts, there are at least three factors that 
could contribute to answer this question. First, as we discuss previously, IGs in Chile 
exhibit a low level of participation in the legislative debate; therefore, it would be no 
surprise to find that participation in this policy area is also low. 
Second, it is possible that people and, more importantly, groups, do not 
perceive foreign policy as a relevant area to their own well-­­being, providing them 
with no incentives to participate. In fact, public opinion surveys done in Chile have 
consistently showed that, since the return to democracy, foreign policy is not one of 
the top priorities in policy making. This suggests that the case of Chile might be 
different to other countries, like the US or those that are part of the EU, where 
relations with other countries might be perceived as more relevant by different 
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political actors. 
Third, it is also possible, as suggested by Dür (2008), that IGs give more 
relevance and prioritize other types or forms of participation to express their 
opinions, like direct contact with the authorities, and therefore concentrate their 
efforts in those types of actions. Research on FTAs negotiations has shown that 
direct contact with authorities has been a used strategy by Chilean IGs, particularly of 
business groups (Gamboa 2013). 
The second issue relevant for future research is related to how to better study 
the issue of influence. As we said, our evidence is inconclusive with respect to which 
groups win and which groups loose in the decision making process. However, this 
result only analyzes the level of congruence between IGs preferences and the 
result, in a context where 75% of interventions are favorable to the treaties. 
Therefore, it might happen that the attempts to influence in policy making through 
their presence in the parliamentary debate are considered less effective than 
attempts to influence in other stages of the policy making process. In this context, 
case studies using process tracing as their main research strategy, and that focus at 
the stage of treaty negotiations (like the "room next door") might be better suited 
to provide a more definitive answer to the question of influence, and to what are 
the determinants of each group' influence in the final decision. 
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